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American  constitutional theory has over its life span  been  hounded
and preoccupied, if not totally  consumed,  by  a search  for harmony  be-
tween  what  are  usually  heard  as  two  clashing  commitments:  constitu-
tionalism and  democracy.  The  search is one  with which  no  partisan  of
democracy can proceed today  without reckoning with the judicial career
of William Brennan.
Do we see some slight to democracy,  some "Counter-Majoritarian
Difficulty,"  to  recall  Professor  Bickel's  famous  phrase,  in  unelected
judges  deciding  the legal  validity  of the enactments  of popular  assem-
blies  and thereby  effectively  ruling  the country?  If we do, then  Justice
Brennan, perhaps  before all  other American  judges, personifies  the dif-
ficulty  we see. I am one  who does  see the difficulty,  who  tries  to  take
democracy  seriously,  and  yet who  counts  the  country  gloriously  well-
served by Brennan's  career. I  therefore  feel bound,  on  this occasion  of
academic exchange  in the Justice's  honor, to return  to the question  that
keeps  the Constitutional  Theory  department  in  business:  Brennan  and
democracy-how  to have both?'
Copyright @ 1998 California Law Review, Inc.
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1.  The Brennan  Symposium Lectures are sponsored by the Brennan  Center  for  Justice at the
New  York University  School of Law  and  funded by  a gift  from  Professor  Thomas  Jorde  of the
University  of California, Berkeley  School  of Law  (Boalt Hall).  My  thanks  to Professor  Jorde,  the
Center, its  staff (especially  Marcy  Schuck)  and  its director Joshua Rosenkrantz,  Deans  Herma  Hill
Kay  and John Sexton of the law  schools  at Berkeley  and N.Y.U.,  and  the  four  commentators  for
providing occasion  and  support  for  this  offering  of  mine in  honor  of  a  man  I  have  loved  and
enormously  esteemed.  Thanks  go, as  well,  to Professors  Larry  Kramer  and Kenneth  Winston  for
valuable comments on prior versions.CALIFORNIA LAW  REVIEW
I end with a surmise about what might have been Brennan's answer,
drawn  from  his words  and  deeds.  I  am  more  concerned  here,  though,
with restating the question. A chief aim of these  remarks  is to  push  dis-
cussion  of  the  conflict  between  constitutionalism  and  democracy  be-
yond  the  Bickelian  Difficulty,  for  the  conflict  has  a  depth  and  a
poignancy  that Bickel's delicately  understated  formulation  fails to  cap-
ture.2
"Constitutionalism"  appears  to  mean  something  like  this:  The
containment  of  politics  by  a  supervening  law  that  stands  beyond  the
reach of the politics it is meant to contain-a  "law  of lawmaking,"  we
may call it-that controls  which further  laws can  be made  and by  what
procedures.  "Democracy"  appears  to  mean  something  like this:  Popu-
lar  political  self-government-the  people  of  a  country  deciding  for
themselves the contents of the laws that organize  and  regulate their po-
litical association.  If these two rough  definitions  fairly  capture  what we
mean  by  "constitutionalism"  and  "democracy,"  then  the  two princi-
ples do  indeed  appear  to be  in  relentless  conflict.  By  the  principle  of
democracy,  people ought to decide for themselves  all the politically  de-
cidable matters  about which they have  a good moral  and material reason
to care. But quite obviously falling among such matters  are the contents
of the  laws of lawmaking  which, by  the  principle  of constitutionalism,
must set limits and bounds on democratic  authority.
To illustrate, consider the following politically decidable questions:
"  Shall there  or  shall  there not  be  in  your  country  a  law of  law-
making that all but prohibits  government from  any  kind of race-
conscious legislation  or administration,  in any  circumstances,  for
any  reason?
*  Shall there  or  shall  there not be  in  your  country  a  law  of  law-
making  that narrowly  restricts the ability  of  the  government  to
regulate  the flow of money  in political campaigns?
This baby tome can't actually have been delivered as a lecture, you say?  Right you are.  First at
Berkeley  on  November  4,  1996,  then  at  N.Y.U.  on  March  10,  1997,  I gave  talks  drawn  from
manuscripts  that  had  been  furnished  in  advance  to  commentators:  Professors  Robert  Post  and
Kathleen  Sullivan  at  Berkeley,  Professors  Ronald  Dworkin  and  Don  Herzog  at  N.Y.U.  The
manuscripts and talks were somewhat  different  on  the two occasions,  although  addressed  to  similar
concerns, in order to take advantage of the participation at Berkeley of Professor  Post and  at N.Y.U.
of Professor  Dworkin,  two scholars  whose  current  writings  on constitutional theory  I  found  myself
drawn to consider at some length by my general theme.  I delivered  the "Post"  part  at Berkeley  and
the  "Dworkin"  part  at  N.Y.U.,  then  pulled the  two  parts  together  and  rewrote  the  whole  for
publication along with the comments of Professors  Dworkin, Herzog, Post,  and  Sullivan.  You  should
expect,  therefore,  to find  some reverberation-I  certainly  hope  that  you  will-between  Parts  III
(re:  Post) and  IV (re:  Dworkin) of what follows.
In  order to convey  a fair  sense  of the occasions  as  they  actually  occurred  and  also  leave  the
commentators with a steady target, I have  tried in the rewriting  to stand  by  everything  to which  the
trenchant comments were  directed.
2.  Others, by comparison, have spoken  of "government  by judiciary."  See  RAOUL  BERGER,
GOVERNMENT  By  JUDICIARY  (1977); 2 Louis B.  BOUDIN,  GOVERNMENT  By  JUDICIARY  12 (1932).
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*  Shall there  or shall there not be in your  country  a law  of  law-
making  that  narrowly  restricts  the  ability  of  government  to
regulate  what people  do  about having  sex,  becoming  pregnant,
remaining  pregnant, or becoming a parent?
The choices posed by such questions  are so obviously  important  to
so many  people,  materially  and  morally,  that  it seems  they  must  fall
within  democracy's  reach  if we take  democracy  seriously  at  all.  But
they are  also choices  about  the  laws of lawmaking,  and  the principle  of
constitutionalism  suggests  that at least some  choices  about  the  laws  of
lawmaking  must  be  placed  securely  beyond  the  reach  of  democratic
politics  to  decide.  In  fact,  the  choices  I  posed  are  decisions  that  the
United  States Supreme  Court  currently  makes  for  this  country,  in  the
course  of interpreting  and  applying  the  country's  established  code  of
laws of lawmaking, the Constitution.3 We confront  a spectacle  of judges
explicitly  holding  themselves  responsible,  according  to  what  they  be-
lieve to be an inevitable inference from the notion of constitutional  gov-
ernment,  to  pronounce  with  finality  on  the  country's  laws  of
lawmaking. The nine-justice  opinion in Cooper  v. Aaron, written mainly
by Brennan, declares  the justices  "supreme  in the exposition  of the law
of the Constitution."4 Similarly,  but even more  assertively, the decisive
plurality  opinion  in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v.  Casey
claims for the justices the role of "speak[ing]  before  all  others for  [the]
constitutional  ideals" (not just the laws)  of American  government.5 The
authors  of those  manifestos  don't  seem particularly  worried  about  the
people  deciding  for  themselves  the  contents  or  even  the  spirit  of the
fundamental  laws. Must we then count them as foes  of democracy?
Not necessarily,  it is  said;  they  may  be  democracy's  friends,  de-
pending on the spirit and content their interpretations  accord to  the laws
of  lawmaking.  There  are  in  circulation  two  main  variations  on  that
theme.  One  variation  construes  democracy  as a  procedural  ideal,  the
other  construes  it as  a substantive  ideal.  Each  variation,  providentially,
has a champion among  the appointed  commentators-Professor  Robert
Post for procedure,  and Professor Ronald Dworkin for substance.  I want
to accompany each  on his journey  from one  of the poles  of this terrain
to the point where the two meet up in paradox. Initially, however, I need
to point out  how controversial  and  problematic  is  the  quest  on  which
3.  See, e.g., Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518  U.S.  604 (1996);  Miller
v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.  200 (1995);  Bowers  v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986);  Buckley  v. Valeo, 424 U.S.  1 (1976);  Roe v. wade,  410 U.S.  113
(1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972);  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479  (1965).
4.  358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958);  see David H. Souteret al., In Memoriam, WilliamJ.  Brennan Jr., 111
HARv.  L. REv.  1, 6-7 (1997)  (remarks of Chief Judge Richard S. Arnold).
5.  505 U.S. 833, 868 (1992) (plurality  opinion).  For an endorsement,  see  RONALD  DwoRKIN,
LiFE's DOMINION  120,  126 (1993).
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both ventures  are  embarked. Reconciling  constitutionalism  with democ-
racy is especially  hard when one takes  the point of democracy-as  both
our champions  do-to be  the realization  of individual  self-government
in public  affairs.
HI
DEMOCRACY  AND  INDIVIDUAL  SELF-GOVERNMENT:
THE INSTITUTIONAL  DIFFICULTY
Why do we care  about  the prevalence  of ostensibly  "democratic"
political  arrangements?  Perhaps some people  who care  about  this do  so
only  because  they  want  people  to  be  governed,  by  whoever  governs
them, in accordance  with their interests.  The rough  idea is that if those
who govern  the people  hold office  on  sufferance  of popular  majorities,
and  if the electoral  and representational  schemes  for  toting  those  ma-
jorities are  geared to a fair reflection of the assortment of interests  in  the
population,  then government will  tend  to respond  decently  to the inter-
ests  of  the  governed.  We  may  call  this  an  "accountability"  or
"welfare"  view  of democracy.
But it seems that some people,  Professors Post6 and  Dworkin7  and
myself included,  care  about democracy  for reasons  that go  beyond  ac-
countability  and  welfare.  We  care  about  democracy  because  we  care
about  people  governing  themselves  politically,  exercising  their  own
charge  over the politically  decidable  conditions  of their lives. In  other
words, we care about  democracy  for  the sake  of that  aspect  of human
dignity and freedom  that is sometimes  called positive liberty!
I will call this  a "self-government"  conception  of democracy.  Ac-
cording  to it, a political  arrangement  is defective  if it fails to  serve  self-
government  in roughly  the way that democracy,  according  to  some  the-
ory,  is  supposed  to  serve  it.  Consider,  for  example,  the  following  ac-
count  of how  democracy  serves  self-government  (on  which  we'll  see
Post and Dworkin  converging  from  their  opposite-looking  initial  con-
ceptions):  Democracy  serves  self-government  by  providing  each  indi-
vidual  with  reason  to  identify  his  or  her  political  agency  with  the
lawmaking  and  other  acts of political  institutions, or to claim  such  acts
as his or her own.
In the views of both  Post  and  Dworkin  (as  well as in  my  own),  the
reference  to individuals  is crucial.  Self-government  conceptions  of  de-
mocracy  divide into two sub-categories,  according to who or  what is the
agent  whose  self-government  concerns  us.  Some  theorists  hold  the
"populist"  view,  as we may  call it, that what finally,  morally  matters  is
6.  See, e.g., ROBERT  C. POST,  CONSTITUTIONAL  DOMAINS  273, 278, 283-84 (1995).
7.  See, e.g., RONALD  DWORKIN,  FREEDOM'S  LAW 21-22  (1996).
8.  See id. (valuing positive liberty as self-determination).
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giving effect to the political will of the people  of a country  as one uni-
fied  "self."  Populists  experience  only  moderate  difficulty  explaining
how majoritarian  decision processes translate into a self-governed  politi-
cal collective.9
However, theorists like Post, Dworkin, and myself, have a great  deal
more  trouble  with this question  because  we are  committed  to the  stan-
dard  liberal  view that  what finally,  morally  matters  is the  agency,  the
freedom,  the dignity,  the self-government  of individuals. We all believe
that there are such things  to speak of as nations  and  peoples  and politi-
cal communities,  and that there  are  reasons  to  care  about  the  histories
and fates of these entities. 10 But I confess  I do not believe, and  I doubt
that any  commentator  does, that a nation,  a people,  or a political com-
munity  is  a  being  possessed  of a  mind  or  any  of the  five  senses,  or
hence, of a capacity  for consciously  self-directive  agency  for  which we
have any final,  moral reason  to care."  So  when  I (perhaps  too  loosely)
speak  of a country's  self-government,  you  must understand  that I have
in mind  the government  of "everyone,"  that is,  of each  person  taken
severally.
Perhaps individuals can be more or less self-governing  in  some de-
partments  of  life.  But it is  not  easy,  to  put  it mildly,  to  explain  how
"everyone"'  can  conceivably  be self-governing  on the field of politics,
where  laws  are  made.  Lawmaking  is  by  its nature  an  institutional,  in
other  words, a collective, endeavor.  How is everyone  to  regard  himself
or herself  as self-governing  through  institutional  events from  which he
or she dissented,  and in which  there  is no  real chance  that  any  single
individual's vote or other political  action  decided  the outcome?  How is
a person  self-governing  through political  enactment  of laws that are re-
volting to him or her? Of this Institutional Difficulty, the judicial  role  of
the Brennans  is certainly  not the cause. Indeed, both Professors Post and
Dworkin pose the question: Is it the cure? Post and Dworkin say democ-
racy  provides  an  answer to the puzzle  of  self-government  that  is  both
individual  and  collective. Democracy,  they  insist, provides  a warrant  in
reason  for the individual's  identification  of his or her political  agency
with the  acts of majoritarian institutions.
9.  See, e.g.,  RICHARD  D.  PARKER,  HERE THE PEOPLE  RULE (1994);  Akhil Reed  Amar,  The
Consent of  the Governed: Constitutional  Amendment Outside Article V,  94 COLUM.  L  REv.  457, 503
(1994).
10.  As to Dworkin, see infra Part IV.C.  As to Post, see Frank I. Michelman,  Must Constitutional
Democracy Be "Responsive?," 107 ETHICS 706,  710-12 (1997).
11.  Cf.  PosT, supra  note 6, at 306 ("Groups  neither  reason  nor have  an  autonomous will; only
persons  do.").
1998]CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
DEMOCRACY  AS  A PROCEDURAL  IDEAL
A.  Post's  Account of Political  Agency
Robert Post puts before us  the ideal  of "responsive  democracy."1
This ideal  envisions  a set of social  and  legal  conditions  in  which  each
individual who cares  to may exercise  actual  self-rule  through  his or her
respective  contributions  to  collective  determinations  of  the  "national
identity"  or "social  order."'3  These  latter terms encompass  the  coun-
try's basic lawmaking  institutions and practices.  But I further  take  them
to include  the reflection  in and  through those  institutions  of major, pre-
vailing  political-cultural  dispositions-for  example,  American  affinities
for personal  sturdiness and  independence,  competition,  and  rewards  to
merit. I  take Post  to be urging  that a national  identity  and  social  order
visibly forged  in  radically  free  public  discourse  is  one  with which  in-
habitants  can  effectively  identify  as "owners,"  responsible  as such  for
the general  social regulations  that issue from this national  character, be-
cause everyone can see in it a true and fair  representation  of the  sum  of
preferences and opinions that individuals  severally and freely  contribute
to its formation. 4  According  to responsive  democracy  theory,  in  other
words, democratic  political legitimacy  consists  in each  individual's  war-
ranted sense of autonomous  participation  in the process  of creating  the
social order in which we live.
For liberals  who care  about  individual  self-government,  the  prob-
lem of politics is that pure  self-determination  by  everyone,  with respect
to  the  social  order  and  fundamental  laws,  is  unattainable  in  a  world
where  deep divergences  of experience  and  valuation preclude  consensus
on every  major question  of social  ordering.  Responsive-democracy  the-
ory  posits  that  the  best  available  substitute  for  the  pure  self-
determination  that we cannot  have is unprejudiced  participatory  access
for  all to a ceaseless  communicative  process-a process  in  which  indi-
viduals contribute their opinion  and  preference  vectors to  a summation
that decides  for the time being  the fundamental  dispensations  of social
life. The overriding  commitment  is to  conditions  in  which  every  indi-
vidual can  have a warranted  sense of autonomous  and  effective contri-
bution  to this creative  process.  As Post argues,  that  is why  we ought  to
strive, above  all else, rigorously  to  maintain  "a  structure  of  [political]
communication"  that is absolutely  unrestricted,  open  to  all  views  that
anyone  might  hold  regarding  the social  order.5  As Post says,  "[i]f  the
12.  See generally PosT, supra note  6.  I  consider  responsive-democracy  theory  at  greater
length in Michelman, supra note 10, at 706-23.
13.  See PosT, supra note 6, at 275,  185.
14.  See id. at 273,  311-12.
15.  See id. at 185-86.
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state were to forbid  the expression  of a particular  idea, the government
would  become,  with respect to individuals  holding  that  idea,  heterono-
mous  and  nondemocratic."16 But if, the theory runs,  we do  as we ought
by maintaining  a reasonably  spacious  sphere of absolutely  unrestricted
public  discourse,  then  the  national  identity  that  is  constantly  being
hammered out in this public space can be said to be one that we all have
freely chosen.  Only then may it be said  that the legal  regulations  of so-
cial  life  that  issue  from  (and  "reflect")  this  freely  chosen  national
identity  are consistent with  self-determination. 7
B. Post's  Procedural  Conception of Democracy
With clear purpose, Post presents  this theory  of responsive  democ-
racy  as bottomlessly  procedural,  resting  on  no  substantive  foundation
and  implying  no  substantive presupposition.  Recalling the fine  formu-
lation  of Claude  Lefort,  Post  speaks  of  "a  regime  founded  upon  the
legitimacy  of a debate as to what is legitimate and what is  illegitimate-a
debate  which  is  necessarily  without  any  guarantor  and  without  any
end."  These  words  suggest  that if we  are  truly  self-governing,  then
proceduralism  goes  all the  way down:  the debate  itself, its framing  and
its procedural norms,  are and can only be what we democratically  make
them.
One can see what might  be prompting  Post and  others  to take  this
view.  Suppose  we  distinguish  between  "pure-procedural"  and
"procedure-independent"  standards  of rightness  for  fundamental  laws.
An example  of a pure-procedural  standard is this: Fundamental  laws are
right  when  they  accurately  represent  the  summation  of  each  person's
duly  expressed  preferences  or  opinions.  An  example  of a  procedure-
independent standard  is this:  Fundamental  laws are right  when  they  ex-
press  and  further  a  moral  mandate  of  equal  respect  and  concern  for
every  citizen.19 Resort  to  procedure-independent  standards  of political
rightness  strikes  some  theorists,  Post  included,  as  deeply  at  odds  with
self-government. The  intuition behind this position is understandable.  If
16.  Id. at 304.
17.  See id. at 274.
18.  Id. at  186 (quoting  CLAUDE  LEFORT,  DEMOCRACY  AND  POLITICAL  THEORY  39  (David
Macey trans.,  1988)).
19.  My category of a "pure-procedural  standard" corresponds  directly to  the case of what John
Rawls calls "pure" procedural justice, where justice or rightness  is directly equated  with performing
the procedure  and  abiding  by  its  outcome.  My  category  of "procedure-independent  standards"
includes  (although  it certainly  is  not  limited  to)  Rawls's  cases  of  "perfect"  and  "imperfect"
procedural  justice, because  those  are  both  cases  in  which  the  conception  of rightn6ss  refers  to
outcomes (e.g., the same size piece of cake for both of us) and not to any procedure  (you cut, I pick),
even if commitment to the conception carries with it an obligation to use a certain procedure  because
of the procedure's known superior propensity to arrive at the desired outcome.  See JOHN  RAWLS,  A
THEORY  OF JUsTIcE  85-86 (1971).
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there is some  substantive  content  that the  laws must possess  to be right,
then to that extent it is not rightfully up to any of us, much less all of us,
to  say  what the  laws  in  substance  shall  be.  Thus,  we  cannot  be  self-
governing, or at least not rightfully  so.
How should admirers of Justice Brennan's career respond  to  such a
radically proceduralist  understanding  of responsive-democracy  theory?
Are Brennan's  free-speech  decisions  directed  to  establishing  the  very
sphere  of  absolutely  unrestricted  public  discourse  that  a  pure-
procedural  understanding  of responsive  democracy  theory  requires?"
That is surely not an incongruous  reading."
However, there is a great deal  more in  Brennan's  work  that a radi-
cally proceduralist  conception  of democracy  theory  cannot  explain.  At
the core  of his  constitutional  jurisprudence  apparently  stands  a  fairly
thick substantive  idea: the inestimable value of the ever-redeemable  dig-
nity  of the individual.'a  This idea, in Brennan's  hands,  implies  a set  of
basic  human  rights that are  both  full of  content  and  strongly  founda-
tional,  respect  for  which is a prerequisite  to  the legitimacy  of  political
power.  Most  dramatically,  it motivates  Brennan's  death-penalty  juris-
prudence.13  It also  obviously  inspires  many  of  his  other  interpretive
convictions,  including  his  views  that  the  Constitution  must  mean  to
guarantee  rights  to individualized  hearings  to those  asserting  eligibility
for  government  benefits, 24  to  confer  expansive  rights  against  self-
incrimination  and  double jeopardy,'  to  guarantee  the  right  to  receive
assistance in voluntarily bringing  one's life  to  an end,2 6 to confer  rights
of sexual  and  procreational  self-determination,27 to  provide  freedom  to
engage in intimate  association28  or to read  whatever one wants in one's
20.  See Texas v. Johnson,  491 U.S. 397  (1989).  Brennan  joined the opinion  of the Court (per
Rehnquist,  C.J.) in Hustler Magazine,  Inc. v. Falwell,  485  U.S.  46 (1988),  to which  Professor  Post
accords  a central place in his reading of our free-speech jurisprudence.  See  PosT, supra note  6,  at
119-78.
21.  Some have found cause for worry in the Meildejohnian rhetoric  of Brennan's  most famous
free-speech  decision,  New  York Times  Co. v. Sullivan,  376  U.S.  254,  269,  274-75  (1964).  Both
Professors Post and Dworkin see an opening to restraint of public discourse in Meiklejohn's "it serves
the course of wise decisions"  rationale  for constitutional  protection  of freedom  of expression.  See
DwomuN, supra note 7, at 199-205; PosT, supra note 6, at 268-89; Michelman, supra note 10, at 707-
08, 710.  For example,  consider  Meiklejohn's remark  that  "[w]hat is essential is  not that everyone
shall speak, but that everything  worth  saying shall be said."  ALEXANDER  MEIKLEJOHN,  POLITICAL
FREEDOM  26 (Oxford Univ. Press  1965) (1948).
22.  See Frank I. Michelman, Super Liberal: Romance,  Community, and Tradition in William J.
Brennan, Jr.'s  Constitutional  Thought,  77 VA.  L. REv. 1261,  1268-69  (1991).
23.  See id;  William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of  Dissents, 37 HASTINGs L.J. 427, 436 (1986).
24.  See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.  254 (1970).
25.  See Malloy v. Hogan,  378 U.S.  1 (1964).
26.  See Cruzan v. Director,  Mo. Dep't of Health,  497  U.S.  261,  301-30  (1990)  (Brennan,  J.,
dissenting).
27.  See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438  (1972).
28.  See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468  U.S.  609, 612-23  (1984).
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home, 29 and to allow criminals to contest the merits  and procedures  of a
conviction  over and  over again.3 0  These  stances cannot  be explained  by
any  pure-procedural  ideal of democratic  government,  nor could such  an
ideal accept that the word of judges  in such  matters  should  prevail over
popular  opposition.
The question remains  whether  Post's  conception  of responsive  de-
mocracy is as purely proceduralist  a conception  as he says. It appears  to
involve at  least  some  substance.  Indeed,  responsive-democracy  theory
rests the possibility  of individual  self-government  in politics  on  a prin-
ciple loaded  with normative content,  that of absolutely  unrestricted  ac-
cess to public discourse for every  person  and every  view. Although  this
principle is about a procedural matter, it is itself a matter of substance;  it
propounds  a foundational  norm  of right  government  that  must  be  re-
garded  as beyond  all debate  by  those  who hold  it.  It  is,  after  all,  pre-
cisely  (and  only)  because  responsive-democracy  theory  rests  on  this
principle  that Professor  Post can  use the theory  to  support  the correct-
ness of some constitutional interpretations  against others,  beginning with
interpretations  that hold  the line stoutly  against  the  least  restriction  of
the content or pitch of expression in public discourse.3'
If responsive-democracy  theory  does  rest  on  a  foundational  pre-
supposition,  perhaps  it is  a  closer  cousin  to  Brennan's  constitutional
theory than we have yet noticed.  Indeed, I believe it is. But then  we are
back  to the question  of  whether  any  conception  of  right  government
that rests  on  a  non-negotiable,  non-debatable,  normative  presupposi-
tion--even such an ostensibly structural  or formal one as absolutely  un-
restricted public discourse for the  sake  of self-government-can  answer
the question  how everyone  is truly  self-governing  in  the  field  of  law-
making.
C. Interpretation:  The Paradox  of Constitutional  Democracy
I will use an argument of Professor Post's to illustrate the problem.
Beyond  question, the  fundamental  laws of this country  include  an
article of assurance  to  all of "the  freedom  of speech. '3 2  A  very  large
majority  of Americans  would  doubtless  endorse  this  article  as  correct.
Controversy breaks out, though,  over some  of its applications.  A recent
example is the question  of constitutional  protection  for virulently  racist
expression  on  state university  campuses  or in  other  public  areas.  The
country's  unanimous  commitment  to "the  freedom  of speech"  is now
up for interpretation. We may assume that everyone loyally  holds  to the
29.  See Stanley  v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969)  (opinion of Marshall, J.).
30.  See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.  391 (1963).
31.  See PosT, supra note 6, at 119-78.
32.  U.S. CoNsr. amend.  I.
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view that there is a correct  interpretation  of the commitment,  a "right"
answer to the question of what the commitment  means,  specifically,  with
respect  to  whether  government  actions  restricting  racially  virulent
speech  in public  are prohibited,  required,  or  permitted.  The  trouble  is
that people  divide  sincerely  and,  within  real political  time,  irresolvably
over what is the right answer.
Since there  is no escaping  the question,  someone  will  have  to  de-
cide it over opposition.  In  our  system,  that would be  someone  like  Jus-
tice  Brennan.  But  what  then  becomes  of  "everyone's  self-
government?"  Can everyone's  self-government  possibly  be  preserved
in  Brennan's  resolution?  It  seems  not,  except  on  the  condition  that
Brennan's resolution,  once sufficiently explained,  could  be seen by  eve-
ryone  to  issue  straightforwardly  from  some  still  loftier  principle  for
government,  some  metaconstitutional  principle,  that  everyone  endorses
as  right.  If that  condition  is not  met,  then  the  fundamental  law  con-
trolled by Brennan's resolution would,  under  guise  of interpretation,  be
written by Brennan  and not, as  everyone's  self-government  requires,  by
everyone.
What Post proposes,  in  effect,  is  a  certain  content  for  the needed
metaconstitutional  principle to which he believes  those  concerned  about
self-government  in politics presumably  have reason  to agree,  to  wit:  as-
surance  to  all persons  and  all  views  of unprejudiced  access  to  unre-
stricted public discourse in which  a national  identity  is constantly  being
forged.  Let that assurance  stand,  then,  as  the  "Really  High  Law"  for
which we can all take  authorship  responsibility.  Brennan  will apply  this
Really High  Law to  decide  whether the intermediately  high  law  of  the
textual Constitution-in our example, the guarantee  of "the  freedom  of
speech"-means  to  prohibit,  require,  or permit  government  actions  re-
stricting  racist speech  in  public.  This  reassuringly  makes  the  question
that  Brennan  decides  one  of  law-application  rather  than  one  of  law-
making.
Or does it? Ostensibly,  Brennan  will apply  the  Really  High  Law of
unrestricted  public discourse  to decide  the textual  Constitution's  mean-
ing with  regard  to government  regulation  of racist speech.  The  trouble
is that he cannot hope to  do  so uncontroversially,  in  view of claims,  not
easily brushed aside  by  those  who do  not  share the life experiences  on
which they are based, that racist speech itself restricts  some people's  ac-
cess  to  public  discourse  as a  medium  of  self-government.33  It  seems,
moreover, that this question  about the Really  High Law's  application  is
inseparable  from  the question  of its identity  (i.e.,  its definition  or  con-
tent, the question  of what the Really  High  Law really  "is"  or  means).
To  put it another  way:  it is not  clear  how  the  notion  of  "unrestricted
33.  See PosT,  supra  note 6, at 319-20.
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public discourse"  can be said  to be one  and  the same  notion,  reflecting
the same large moral,  metaphysical,  or ideological  commitments,  under
alternative  interpretations  of  it  to  decide  the  textual  "freedom  of
speech"  guarantee's  application  to  government  restriction  of  racist
speech.  Yet that interpretative  question,  involving  a  morally  and  ideo-
logically  loaded  practical  question,  is  sharply  contested  in  our  society
now. It seems not to be the case, then, that everyone  agreed  to  the same
Really High  Law, at  least  not  in any  sense  that  could  make  everyone
self-governing  through  authorship  of that Really  High  Law.  Thus,  the
Really-High-Law  principle  of  absolutely  unrestricted  public  discourse
seems to be either too indeterminate  or too partisan  to  qualify  as an  ex-
ercise of everyone's  self-government.
This  is the paradox  of constitutional  democracy,  and  it appears  to
be generalizable. On the one hand, we are driven to locate the possibility
of  a  lawmaking  consensus-the  possibility  of  everyone's  self-
government by  and  through  law-at the level of "higher"  as opposed
to ordinary lawmaking,  precisely  on the understanding that fundamental
laws  prescind from  the concrete  conflicts  of interest, belief, and  valua-
tion  that ordinary  lawmaking  cannot consensually  resolve. The hope  is
that  everyone  can  autonomously  judge the lawmaking  system fair, and
thus count themselves  the authors of even  specific  outcomes  with which
they  deeply  disagree.  The  theory  of  "everyone's  self-government"
through  responsive democracy  rests on exactly  such  a  hope:  in  Post's
words,  that  "citizens  can..,  embrace  the  government  as  rightfully
'their  own"' because  they accept  the fairness  of the system  of national
identity  formation  through  absolutely  unrestricted  public  discourse-
because,  as he says, the maintenance of the  system instills in citizens  "a
sense of participation,  legitimacy,  and identification. ',
On  the other hand,  this abstraction  of  the fundamental  laws  from
specific controversies  creates  a problem.  The  matters  to  be  resolved  by
interpretation  of  these  abstract  laws  are  characteristically  themselves
such  major political-moral  issues that  resolutions  of  them  one  way  or
the other  cannot be  separated  from  determinations  of the  fundamental
laws themselves.  It seems that the quest  for  individual  self-government
in politics-the commitment to select the fundamental  laws in a way that
responds  to  and  satisfies  everyone's  interest  in  self-government-
requires  that  not  only  the  initial,  abstract  formulations  of  the  funda-
mental laws be accomplished in such a way, but also  all major  interpre-
tations  of them.  But the only  way to  arrive  at  effectively  authoritative
(law-like)  interpretations  is  institutionally,  by  some  non-unanimous,
collective process. Thus, there is only one way  in which  such  interpreta-
tions can  be compatible  with everyone's  self-government:  standing  be-
34.  Id. at 273.
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hind  the fundamental  laws  that  are  up  for  interpretation  at  any  given
time must be a still more abstract and  fundamental  set of principles,  the
Really High Laws.  These laws must be attributable  to everyone's  author-
ship, and  at the  same  time be  capable  of  deciding  objectively  among
contesting interpretations  of the fundamental  laws. But the Really  High
Laws, being  even more  abstract than  the merely  fundamental  laws, will
even more  certainly  require  controversial  interpretation  on  the  way  to
deciding what we need for them to decide. We are  faced  with an  infinite
regress. 35
That may  all be just a long-winded  way  of  taking  issue  with  any
proposed  "non-foundational"  conception  of constitutional  rightness.  It
appears  that constitutionalism-the  endeavor to place  government  under
reason expressed as law-inevitably  means  the establishment  of some a
priori  fixed, non-negotiable,  non-debatable  set  of  normative  prerequi-
sites. For present purposes, it does not matter  whether  we call them pre-
requisites  to the legitimacy  of power  or prerequisites  to  the  legitimacy
of a debate that determines  the legitimacy  of power. Examples  of such
prerequisites  include  absolutely  unrestricted  public  discourse  and  un-
yielding  respect  for  the  ever-redeemable  dignity  of  individuals.  One
could  see  these  as  cultural  commitments  of  constitutional  democracy,
and  be  driven  toward  the  conclusion  that  only  in  the  happy  circum-
stance  of their general  a priori acceptance  by  the people  of  a  country
can  there  possibly  be both  self-government  and  constitutional  govern-
ment. 36 On this matter, it seems to me that Brennan's career points in the
right, the inevitable  direction.  Notice, however, that  on  this pleasant  as-
sumption of an a priori  convergence  among  a country's  people  on the
basic normative  principles  of right  government,  it is no  longer  evident
that there  is a place  for democracy at the  level of fundamental  law de-
termination.
IV
A DEMOCRACY  AS  A SUBSTANTIVE  IDEAL
Recall the questions that need to be answered.  First, how might  one
simultaneously  embrace  both  Brennan  and  democracy?  Second,  how
might  one be  considered  "self-governing"  through  political  enactment
35.  Compare the objections of critical legal theorists to what they used to call "liberal legalism."
See  Frank  I.'  Michelman,  Justification (and Justifiability) of  Law  in  a  Contradictory World,  in
JUSTIFICATION  71,  79-81  (J.  Roland  Pennock  & John  W.  Chapman  eds.,  1986)  (describing  the
argument in Duncan Kennedy,  The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries,  28  BuFu.  L  REV.  205
(1979)).
36.  Compare the pivotal role in John Rawls's more recent  political  theory  of the  latenby  in the
public political cultures of some countries of a conception of everyone as free and equal at the bar  of
politics. See STEPHEN  MULHALL  & ADAM  SWIFT,  LIBERALS  AND  COMMUNITARIANS  189-90  (2d ed.
1992); JOHN  RAwLS,  POLITICAL  LIBERALISM  13-14 (1993).
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of a law to which he is opposed?  Remember  also  the  form  of  the  an-
swers posed  by  both  Post  and  Dworkin:  Brennan  may  be  a  friend  to
both  democracy  and  self-government.  It  may  be  that  Brennan  as  a
judge  is uniquely  well-situated  to ensure provision  of something,  some
quality or feature, that is required  of majoritarian political institutions  in
order to  make them into  vehicles  of self-government.  For Post, follow-
ing that line of thought, democracy  is a procedural  ideal, the pursuit  of
which lands him (I have argued) in  substance.  For Dworkin, democracy
is a substantive ideal. Will the pursuit of it land him in procedure?
A. Dworkin's Substantive Conception of Democracy
At the level of the fundamental  laws or laws of lawmaking, Dworkin
argues,  the  question  of  democracy  is  not  answerable  in  procedural
terms, by finding out who makes the laws say what they do;  it is answer-
able  only  in substantive  terms, by  finding  out  what  those  laws  in  fact
say. Some  fundamental-legal  content  serves  democratic  ends,  and  some
does not. The content of Brown v. Board of Education 7  does; the  con-
tent  of Plessy v.  Ferguson' did  not.  Fundamental-legal  content  serves
democratic  ends  and  values only  when  it rules  out  caste,  guarantees  a
broad  and  equitable  political  franchise,  prevents  arbitrary  legal  dis-
criminations  and other oppressive uses of state  powers, and  assures  gov-
ernmental  respect for freedoms  of thought,  expression,  association,  and
for the intellectual and moral independence  of every citizen.
39
Dworkin thus presses the point,  as others have in the  past,40 that one
can  speak of a constitution  that is democratic  in virtue of its content,  as
well  as of one  that is democratic  in virtue  of  its  authorship.  His  point,
unassailable as far as it goes, is that allowing the country  to be  governed
in part  by judges  is not  necessarily  anti-democratic,  once  you  accept
that the objective  for democracy  must be to get the choices  among  the
laws of lawmaking  resolved  in accord  with the right  or best conception
of a democratic  political  regime.  To  accept that as the objective  is also
to accept that indeed there is such a thing to speak of as  this "right"  or
"best"  conception  of  a  democratic  political  regime.1  But  then  you
have  to  accept  as  well  the  practical  possibility  that  the  constitutional
37.  347 U.S. 483 (1954).
38.  163 U.S. 537 (1896).
39.  See DwoRIUN, supra  note 7, at  16-18,  24-26;  Ronald Dworkin,  Equality, Democracy, and
Constitution:  We the People  in Court,  28 ALBERTA L REV. 324, 337-42 (1990).
40.  John Hart Ely has advanced a similar argument in  his writings,  see, e.g.,  JOHN  HART  ELY,
DEMOCRACY  AND  DISmusT  (1980),  though  there  are  important  differences  between  the
constitutional theories of Dworkin and Ely.  See RONALD DWORIN, A  MATTER OF  PRINCIPLE  33-71
(1985).
41.  As,  of course, Dworkin does.  See, e.g., RONALD  DwoRiN,  LAw's  EMPIRE  76-86  (1986);
DWORIN, supra note 40, at 33-71.
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interpretations  reached  by  an independent  judiciary  might be closer  to
the right  conception  of democracy  than  those  proposed  by  the  people
and their tribunes.  Therefore, Dworkin  argues,  concession  to the judici-
ary  of final  constitutional-interpretive  authority  cannot  be  classified  as
counter-democratic  "in  principle,"  just as  such.42  An  intended  conse-
quence  of this argument  is  to  provide  a  defense  of Justice  Brennan's
career  against charges  of riding  roughshod  over  democracy.  Of course,
it is not Brennan  by  name  that Dworkin  defends  but the mode  of con-
stitutional  adjudication  that  Brennan's  career  represents.  Assuming
Brennan's  constitutional  adjudications  match  up  well  with  what  you
think makes for a substantively democratic  regime,  you  should  have  no
trouble  counting  him  a monumental  contributor  to  the  project  of  de-
mocracy  in America.
If you  are  one  of those  who think  that accountability  and  welfare
are  all that  democracy  might  be  good  for,  then  Professor  Dworkin's
argument should  go down easily  with you.  The  American  system of di-
vided government, including  its provision for partial  government  by  the
judiciary, has from the beginning  been  plausibly  and  indeed  brilliantly
defended  on the ground  that it will probably  respond  better  to  the  true
interests of the governed43  than  would  a more  purely  populist  system."
Dworkin  is extending  that argument  to include  people's  interests  in  the
prevalence of a democratic  state of political  affairs  in  their country.  Di-
vided  government,  he  is  saying-partial  government  by  judiciary-
might very well serve that interest better than  would  a more  purely  pro-
cedural  democratic  regime.
But matters are not so straightforward  for  Professor  Dworkin  him-
self, because  for  him  the point  of democracy  is not just  accountability
or  welfare,  it  is  also  self-government.  It  is  not  clear  how  a  self-
government  view of democracy can coexist with  the  notion  that democ-
racy is a matter only of the content  of the  laws  and  not of their author-
ship, a matter  only  of substance  and not  of procedure.  The  problem  is
that  self-government  is  indisputably  an  activity,  a  procedure,  and  it
therefore  seems that a self-government  view of democracy  simply  can-
not escape  the use of a procedural  test for  the  presence  or  absence  of
the democracy  it envisions.  According  to  a  self-government  view,  de-
mocracy  is at its fullest when  a country's  people  decide  for  themselves,
by democratic  political  procedures,  all  of those conditions  of their  lives
that are politically  decidable.
42.  See  DWORKIN,  supra note 7,  at 32-35.
43.  This includes any  interests  they  may  have  in the joys and  indulgences  of political  speech
and association,  of voting and office-holding.
44.  See, e.g., THE  FEDERALIST  Nos.  10, 46, 51 (James Madison),  No. 78  (Alexander Hamilton).
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But  is  it really  so?  Does  a  self-government  view  of  democracy
really  require  that the people  decide  all the politically  decidable  ques-
tions?  Must the procedures  of  political  self-government,  in  all  consis-
tency,  really extend to deciding the fundamental  laws of the country,  the
rules and norms that set the  aims and limits of governmental  powers and
establish  the  system  for  any  and  all  further  lawmaking?  The  answer
seems  inescapably  to be  "yes,"  in  view of the moral  and material  im-
portance  that people  quite reasonably  attach  to the content  of many  of
these laws of lawmaking. Even so, we will always feel  an impulse  to hive
off the fundamental  laws from  democracy's  procedural  purview, to re-
strict the domain  of procedurally  democratic  decision to  whatever fur-
ther political choices the laws of lawmaking  leave  open, while  assigning
determinations  of those laws themselves  to some  other jurisdiction.  The
impulse is to allow  some other, pre-democratic  authority  to  apply  moral
reason,  rather  than  political  will, to  decide  the  fundamental-legal  pre-
conditions  of justice  or prosperity  or  liberty  or  even,  as  Dworkin  is
rightly bent on showing, democracy  itself. And  it is this impulse  we see
exemplified  in Dworkin's proposition  that we judge the  democratic  cre-
dentials  of  a  constitution  by  reference  to  its  content  rather  than  its
authorship.  Behind  the  impulse  stands  an  apparently  crushing  logical
objection  to the alternative,  that the contents  of the laws  of  lawmaking
could  be within the keeping  of a democratic  procedure  to  decide.  We
will get to that objection  in Part V, but first we need  to notice  another
reason  why Dworkin  is led to  seek the American  Constitution's  demo-
cratic  credentials  in its regulative content and not in the procedures  used
in that content's  creation.
B. Interpretation: "Moral Reading" versus Procedural  Legitimation
Some  theorists  take  an  opposite  tack, seeking  to  uphold  the  Con-
stitution's  democratic  credentials  in strictly procedural  terms.  The  peo-
ple,  they  say,  directly  choose  the  laws  of  lawmaking  through  the
political procedures  of constitutional  ratification  and  amendment.  One
could  cite  a number  of  grounds  for  doubting  the  credibility  of  this
view, 45 but here  I only  want  to  make  the point  that  it is  closed  off  to
Dworkin,  and whoever else shares  the depth  of his  commitment  to  the
interpretive character of law.
At the point of application, constitutional law is always a product of
someone's  interpretation  of  the  texts,  traditions,  and  precedents  of
which this law is formed. So  argues Dworkin,  and I agree;  perhaps  most
lawyers  would  as well. But Dworkin  carries  this point  to  lengths  where
not everyone  would  follow.  He  finds  no  escape  from  what he  calls  a
45.  See, e.g., DwoRIuN, supra note 40.
1998]CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
"moral  reading"  of the  Constitution's  abstract  rights-declarative  words
and  phrases,  including  "freedom  of speech,"  "liberty,"  "due  proc-
ess"  and  "equal  protection"  of law. A legal interpreter  of these  expres-
sions, he contends,  has no choice but to treat them  as "invocations"  of
political-moral values or principles  that the interpreter  must distill from
what she finds  to be major  fixed points  in the American  constitutional
tradition.  Such a distillation simply  cannot  be accomplished  without in-
troducing  one's  own substantive  vision of the  ends  and  ideals  of con-
stitutional  government.'
Much  of  Justice  Brennan's  work  exemplifies  the  moral  reading
approach  to constitutional  interpretation.  A good  exhibit  is the case  of
Michael H. v. Gerald  D. 47 An unwed  natural  father  seeks  a right to  visi-
tation with a child whose mother was married to another man at the time
the  child  was  born.  State  law has  long  denied  the  natural  father  any
visitation right in these  circumstances.  This father  seeks relief from  the
state law, claiming  that  his  visitation  interest  is  a  constitutionally  pro-
tected component  of fourteenth  amendment  "liberty."  In his majority
opinion, Justice Scalia concludes  that such  an  interest  cannot  be  a con-
stitutionally  protected  one  because  American  law  typically  and  tradi-
tionally  never  granted  visitation  to  men  in  the petitioner's  position."
Brennan,  dissenting, protests against this method  of decision.  He recalls
prior  Court  decisions  extending  the  protection  of  fourteenth  amend-
ment "liberty"  to  a class of what he calls "generalized  interests"  that
society  traditionally  has  thought  important.  Among  these  generalized
interests, he lists "freedom  from  physical  restraint,  marriage, childbear-
ing,  [and]  childrearing."49 Brennan says  that the  decisive  question  must
be  whether the natural father's  visitation  interest  falls  under  a  general
principle  of liberty  that these traditionally  esteemed,  generalized  inter-
ests instantiate. For Brennan,  the law's preexistent refusal  to  respond  to
an unwed natural father's visitation interest  could be explained  as  a fail-
ure on  the law's part  to measure  up  to  its  own  immanent  standard  of
reason. Correcting  for  such failures  was, in  his  view, a chief mission  of
the office he held.
Nothing  could  better  exemplify  what  Dworkin  commends  as  a
"moral  reading"  of  the  Constitution.  But,  as  the case  also  illustrates,
and as Dworkin himself explicitly  recognizes,  moral  readings  of consti-
tutional law inevitably involve the readers  in resolutions  of innumerable
issues  that  involve  major  political-moral  controversies.  And  on  these
controversies,  sincere and thoughtful people can  and do differ. Dworkin
46.  See DWORKIN,  supra note 7, at 2-4.
47.  491 U.S.  110(1989).
48.  See id  at 124.
49.  Id. at 139 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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refers  to  such  controversies  as  "great  and  defining  issues,"5  and
"intractable,  profound questions  of political  morality  that philosophers,
statesmen,  and  citizens have debated  for many  centuries  with  no  pros-
pect of  agreement."'"  I mentioned examples  of such  issues earlier when
I discussed  interpretations  of  our  Constitution's  equal  protection,  due
process,  and  free  expression  principles-Adarand,  Miller  v.
Johnson, Griswold, Roe, and Buckley  v.  Valeo. Notions  of equality  and
democracy  and  freedom  and fairness  can  doubtless help  frame  debate
over such  morally  fateful interpretive  issues, but  the  sincerest  commit-
ment to such  ideals  cannot  incontrovertibly  settle these  issues.  Such  a
possibility  is precluded  by  diversities  of experience  and vision and  the
thousand  shocks  to which  human  interpretive  judgment  is heir-what
John Rawls  calls the "fact" of reasonable  pluralism  and the burdens  of
judgment. 2  In  the  face of irresolvable,  reasonable  disagreement,  some-
one must decide these interpretive  questions.  Whoever does  not partici-
pate in the decision, for whatever reason,  is to that extent  governed  by
those who do.
It is now apparent  why the moral-reading  theory  of  constitutional
adjudication  debars its partisans  from  the procedural  way of defending
the Constitution's  democratic  character-by  pointing  to  the  historical
facts of popular  enactment  of  the  laws that  the  Brennans  interpret.  It
does so because,  on the moral-reading  theory,  the people's  enactments
contain  too  small  a  share,  and  the  moral  readings  of  them  by  the
Brennans contain  too large a share, of the total  sum of operative  consti-
tutional  meaning  that is to  be  made.  There  is too  much  meaning  left
politically  unresolved  at the point  of promulgation  and  ratification  of
constitutional  text. According  to  the  self-government  view,  democracy
means  the people  deciding  for  themselves  by  political  procedures  the
politically  decidable  conditions  of social life in which  they  have moral
or material reason to take an interest. It follows that if someone  is going
to undertake  moral readings  of constitutional  texts  in  order  to  resolve
for  the country  such basic  and  contested issues of political  morality  as
those  presented  by  affirmative  action,  racist  speech,  political  finance,
term  limits,  physician-assisted  suicide,  abortion,  gay  rights,  and  gun
control, the people  acting democratically  ought to be that someone.  The
main  work  of  constitutional  interpretation,  cannot  lie  beyond  democ-
racy's purview.53
50.  See DwolRYN, supra note 7, at 46.
51.  DwoRIUN, supra note 5, at 120.
52.  See RAwLs,  supra note 36, at 36-37, 54-58.
53.  I expect some resistance to this conclusion, although not much from Professor Dworkin, so I
want at least to indicate briefly how I would go about heading off the three likeliest lines of objection
to it, which I will call the objections from abstraction,  from concretion,  and from right-answerism.
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Nevertheless it may have to, for the story is not over yet.
C. Dworkin's Account of Political  Agency
Remember  the  Institutional  Difficulty:  How  might  one  be  self-
governing  through  institutional  enactment  of a law to  which he  is  op-
posed?  (Why  not  rather  say  that constitutional  restrictions  on  majori-
tarian  lawmaking  support  positive  freedom,  considering  that  such
restrictions,  while  not  measurably  detracting  from  any  individual's
"control  of his own fate,"  are quite  likely  to enhance  such  control  in
many of their applications?') Professor Dworkin  says  that there  is only
one agency in sight that can honestly be said to  make  law, the collective
that we call a people  or a citizenry.  Therefore, he  continues,  the  individ-
ual's identification  with  that collective lawmaking  agency  would be  the
only way in which there could be satisfaction of each  individual's  inter-
est in being a self-governing  person. It follows that a solution  to the In-
Here  is a  schematic  rendition  of the objection  from abstraction:  It  should  not  be  insuperably
difficult for a constitutional interpreter to document a finding that the people  have,  or have  not, ever
enacted into  their  constitutional  instrument  an expression  of one  or another  abstract  political-moral
principle-for example, the principle of political equality.  Suppose they have.  Then to that extent the
question of the people's  self-government  depends  strictly  on  whether  the government  they receive
back from judges and others does or does not proceed in accord with the principle of equality that the
people enacted.  In theory, as long as it does, all is well; the people govern themselves.
I don't believe it.  It appears to me that self-government is too gravely  compromised by the range
and gravity of the questions that the abstract principle of political equality  leaves  open  to debate  and
resolution.  Consider the current  controversy  in America  over  governmental  "colorblindness"  as  an
uncompromisable principle of constitutional  law.  Issues of this magnitude are  too fraught  with moral
and material  significance  to allow  us to say  that constitutional  law  is  democratic  in  virtue  of  the
people themselves having written the equal protection or due process clause into the Constitution.  See
supra Part III.C.
But a principle of political equality (to continue with the example) is surely  not the only  one  that
the people  may be found  to have  enacted  into their  governing  instrument.  This  brings  us  to  the
objection from concretion,  or as it might  be  called,  the objection  from  integrity.  The  question  for  a
constitutional interpreter is always one of how best to synthesize numerous abstract principles  that the
people over time enacted into their constitution, adding to the normative  mix  whatever  past synthetic
interpretations have proven themselves to be enduring ones.  This exercise  is more  thickly  informed
and constrained than  determining the application of any single abstract principle taken alone.  But it  is
not constraining enough to abate the problem I am posing.  Dworkin  himself has  characterized  these
synthetic normative  judgments of legal  interpretation  as  both  bottomlessly  political  and  as  having
components  of aesthetic judgment.  See DwoRIuN,  supra note 41,  at 73-76,  87-93,  229-32.  In  short,
among sincere  and  reasonable  disputants,  there  are bound  to be  a  plurality of constructions  of the
data-a duck perceived here, a rabbit perceived  there; a social-realist  tragedy  here,  a  playful  roman
ti clef there-that  leave  in dispute  the sorts  of morally  and materially  freighted  issues  that  people
cannot leave to be resolved by others and still seriously claim to be self-governing.
This  brings  us  to  the  objection  from  right-answerism.  It  is  arguable  that  the  real-time
interminable disputability of constitutional issues does not mean there is no  such  thing as  getting  them
right.  I accept that premise without reservation.  From it,  someone  might argue  that people  are  self-
governing as long as they enact the grist of the principles  that go into an  interpretation  mill  which  is
itself as  aptly designed  as  we  can make  it to  turn  out  true  interpretations  of  the  principles.  My
complex response to this claim  appears in Parts V and VI below.
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stitutional Difficulty would  depend  on  the following  sort of possibility:
Observing  a  surrounding  political  community  making  laws  through
majoritarian  political  processes,  a  person  can,  by  counting  herself  a
member of that community,  claim ownership  of its  lawmaking acts--can
regard its acts as her own."  Democracy,  it might be said:
[A]ttempts to reconcile  individual autonomy  with collective  self-
determination  by  subordinating  governmental  decision-making
to communicative processes  sufficient to instill in citizens a sense
of  participation,  legitimacy,  and  identification.  Al-
though..,  there  may  be no  determinative  fusion  of individual
and  collective  will, citizens  can...  embrace  the  government  as
rightfully  "their  own"  because  of  their  engagement  in  these
communicative  processes.
But of course it is not Professor Dworkin  who wrote that;  it is Professor
Post.5 6
Professor  Dworkin proceeds  to state certain  rational  preconditions
for this sort of identification.  I cannot,  he says, reasonably  ally  my  po-
litical  agency  with that  of any  collective  that  does  not  by  its  actions
maintain  a due  respect for  my  own  moral  and  intellectual  singularity,
and for the interest I accordingly  take  in both  the  content  of collective
outcomes  and  my  capacities  to  influence  these  outcomes.  What  is re-
quired, then, is the collective's  assurance to each member of:  (1) unhin-
dered  and  equal  access  to  wide-open  and  effective  channels  of  public-
opinion formation;  (2) an equal measure  of consideration  for  the inter-
ests of each  in decisions  of public  policy;  and  (3)  insulation  from  col-
lective  control of each individual's  capacities  for  self-responsible  moral
and intellectual  reflection and judgment.5 7 This list looks much like what
is  guaranteed  by  our  Constitution's  first,  fifth,  and  fourteenth  amend-
ments-or, rather, it looks like what is found  in those  texts by  constitu-
tional  interpreters  such  as Brennan.  Professor  Dworkin  meant precisely
that it should. His claim is that an independent  judiciary  can, by  rightly
construing  and  effectuating  constitutional  law,  secure  fulfillment  of
certain  rational  preconditions  for  an  individual  to  identify  his  or  her
political  agency  with the political community's  lawmaking  acts.  By thus
securing the possibility  of everyone's  self-government  on  the  field  of
lawmaking, the practice  of judicial review  can, if well  conducted,  solve
the Institutional Difficulty. Wow!
Yes,  okay,  wow. But I  do  not  think  this  stunning  argument  suc-
ceeds. Professor Dworkin says that certain constitutional guarantees  give
individuals a warrant in reason for a kind of self-identification  with cer-
55.  See id. at 21-22.
56.  Posr, supra note 6, at 273.
57.  See DWORKIN,  supra note 7, at 24-26.
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tain political  events.  That identification  must  reside  in  individual  con-
sciousness, as either a belief or a feeling.  Say  it is a belief. What belief?
Not the belief that I, the individual,  actually  make  the  laws or exert  de-
tectable  influence  on  legislative  outcomes,  because  one  of Dworkin's
starting  points  for  this  whole  discussion  is  that  no  one  in  large-scale
democratic  conditions can reasonably  believe that. Even  so, of course,  I
might believe that I have reason to abide by the laws that are collectively
made.  That belief is not,  however, sufficient  to  Dworkin's  purpose.  It
leaves us with an  account  of how  we might  reasonably  come  to respect
and  accept  laws made  by  others,  which  seems  quite  different  from  an
account  of how we might  reasonably  come  to  regard  ourselves  as  law-
maker to ourselves.
Say, then,  that it  is  not  a  belief that  Dworkin  has  in  mind,  but  a
feeling. Say it is a feeling  of satisfaction  or even  pride  that I might  take
in  lawmaking done by an organization  that treats me  and  my  independ-
ence and my interests  with the kind  of respect  that is due  an  individual
member.  Or say  that such  treatment  engenders  a feeling  that I did the
lawmaking.  Neither  of those  feelings  is the  same  thing  as  my  actually
having done the lawmaking. Dworkin, on this account of his view,  seems
to have mistaken  a case of affect  or attitude for a case of  agency.  For
me to  "identify"  sympathetically  with  the doer  of an  act is not for me
to  have  done  the  act.  I  understand  that one  might  speak  here  of  an
"identification"  that  is more  than  sympathetic,  an  identification  that is
ontological in some way that is supposed to allow  the collective's  action
to  "pass  through"  to  the  member.  But  talk  of  that  organicist  kind
would be wildly  out  of temper  with the rest of Ronald  Dworkin's  legal
and political  philosophy."  Walt Whitman  was large,  or  so  he  claimed,
and  contained  multitudes.  I  happen  to  think  that,  among  judges,
Brennan  was  large  and  contained  multitudes.  That,  however,  does  not
make  Brennan  everyone,  or allow me  to  say  that  through  his  govern-
ment I govern myself.
On  the face  of it, Dworkin's  message  is  a happy  one.  It  offers  to
resolve an  apparent  conflict between  two of our deepest  professed  po-
litical desires. His  argument  seems  meant  to reassure  and  persuade  us
that we really  can  reconcile  a  democratic  aspiration  for  political  self-
government  by  everyone  with the  practice  of allowing a few judges  to
determine the operative contents  of the country's  basic laws. But I think
the deeper and darker-hued message  is that there is no  such reconcilia-
tion to be had. And this brings us back to the crushing logical  objection
I mentioned  before,  the objection  to  the  idea  that the  contents  of  the
58.  See,  e.g.,  RONALD  DwoRKIN,  TAKING  RIGHTS  SERIOUSLY  172  (1977)  ("Right-
based...  theories ...  place  the  individual  at  the  center,  and  take  his  decision  or  conduct  [and
independence]  as  of fundamental  importance.").
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laws of lawmaking  could  themselves be within the keeping  of a demo-
cratic procedure to decide.
V
THE PARADOX  OF  CONSTITUTIONAL  DEMOCRACY
If you care about  democracy  at all, if democracy  is  a fighting  issue
for you, you  have to mean something  by  it. Your commitment  to  de-
mocracy means  that you  strive to make  the  laws of lawmaking  in your
country  conform to the requirements  of whatever it is that you  mean  by
"democracy."  How  can  you  possibly-how  can  you  conceivably-
leave democracy  to decide the question of what democracy means in the
first place?
No procedure  can decide the question  of that procedure's  own fit-
ness to decide  either  that or  any  other  kind  of question.
59  One  can  al-
ways propose  a historical  account  of how our  extant  constitutional  law
came  to have its present  regulative  content,  and  one  can  always  claim
that the history is a democratic  one. But we cannot  cite that history,  no
matter how  exquisitely  democratic  we may  claim it to  have  been,  as  a
basis  for affirming  or demanding  respect  for  the  extant  constitutional
law. We cannot,  that is, without presupposing  that it is right  to  enforce
on a country whatever constitutional  law may have issued from that par-
ticular  sort  of  assertedly  democratic  history.  And  that  presupposition
cannot itself be grounded  in any fact of its having  issued  from  a demo-
cratic history, without landing us in a bad infinite regress.
The point is important enough to restate in different terms. Democ-
racy is a demanding  normative  idea, an  idea with content,  however un-
certain  or disputable that content  may  be.  Maybe  everyone  agrees  that
democracy  connotes  a procedure  of joint  decision  by  many  persons
somehow  acting  together. But no  less essentially, it connotes  a  socially
constituted relationship  among  parties  to the procedure.  You  will not, I
hope, regard a political procedure  as democratic-and this is what I take
to  be  Dworkin's  darker-hued  message-unless  participants  enter  the
procedure  in the appropriate  relations  of equality,  independence,  free-
dom,  and  security,  vis-h-vis  one  another  and  vis-h-vis  the political  col-
lective  and  its  powers.  So  there  can  be  no  democracy  without  first
positing what is to all intents and purposes a bill of rights  having  an  op-
erational  content  corresponding  to  these  relations  of  democracy  ac-
cording  to  some  more-or-less  definite  understanding  of  that  idea.'
Whatever  may  be  the  content  of  that  more-or-less  definite
59.  As  Professor  Dworldn  says,  democracy  "cannot  prescribe  the  procedures  for  testing
whether the conditions  for the procedures  it does prescribe are met."  DWORKIN,  supra  note 7, at 33.
60.  This says nothing about the institutional arrangements for applying or "enforcing" the bill of
rights.
1998]CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
understanding, it can never be allowed  to  vary  with the outcome  of any
vote or other collective-decision  procedure.6'  Nor  can there  ever be any
guarantee that the given procedure will decide  a particular fundamental-
legal question  in  the way that is required  by  that understanding  of de-
mocracy, not even a vote taken under what you or anyone else considers
to  be  ideal  democratic  conditions.  It  evidently  follows  that  whoever
cares  about  democracy  has  to take responsibility  for deciding  such  is-
sues  independently  of  any  putatively  democratic  procedural  endorse-
ment,  or else  hand  that  responsibility  over  to  the  judges.  Or  to  the
philosophers.
It is necessity,  then,  that explains  the irrepressible  impulse  to  hive
off fundamental-law  determinations  from  the  procedural  purview  of
democracy.  This impulse does  not ultimately  spring  from  reflection  on
what it is prudent  or desirable  for  democracy  to  do.  Rather,  it springs
from  logic.  This  logic,  unhappily  for  some,  entirely  bars  democracy
from a decision-space  where it would seem urgently  and  rightly  to  want
to go, that of deciding  the contents  of a country's  most  basic  laws,  its
laws of lawmaking.
VI
THE DEMOCRATIC  PURSUIT  OF DEMOCRATIC  JUSTICE?
I will return  to Brennan  soon,  but I want to open  the  way back  to
him by considering briefly  how it might be possible to  redeem in  theory
not only  the logical  possibility  but  the  moral  necessity  of  democratic
procedures  in  determinations  of even  the  most fundamental  laws  of  a
country.  Let us start from  what I  take  to  be  the  well-spring  of liberal
political thought, the problem  of power and  force.  Any  established  po-
litical order sooner or later threatens  force  against  individuals  within  its
range of authority.  Committed to regarding  those  individuals  as norma-
tively  and primordially  free and  equal, liberal  thought  is driven to con-
clude that such a regime of force  can be right  only  insofar  as everyone
subject to it has  his  own  reasons  for  agreeing  to  its basic  terms, includ-
ing its laws of lawmaking.62  For such  laws to be  right  and just, to be  as
they morally  ought to be  in  a liberal  view, they  must respond  to every-
one's reasons  (although not everyone  may be conscious  of having  such
reasons)-reasons  that are  objectively  consonant  with everyone's  inter-
ests or that are in  accord  with what everyone,  being  reasonable,  would
61.  Cf.  RAWLS,  supra note  19 (describing "pure procedural justice").
62.  As  John Rawls puts  the matter:  "[O]ur  exercise  of  political  power  is... justifiable  only
when..,  in  accordance  with a  constitution the essentials  of which all  citizens  may  reasonably  be
expected  to endorse  in  the  light  of principles  and  ideals  acceptable  to  them  as  reasonable  and
rational." RAWLS,  supra  note 36, at 217; see also MULHALL &  Swivr, supra  note 36, at 190.
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agree to in a proper normative discourse. 63 Justice, as thus  liberally  con-
ceived, sets an  objective standard  for constitutional  law. Allowing, opti-
mistically  perhaps, that some constitutional-legal content may satisfy  the
standard, some certainly  does not.
Which  constitutional-legal content, if any,  satisfies  the standard  is a
question  not finally  decidable  by  the  procedure  of  democratic  self-
government. However, and  I might  say luckily  for  democracy,  this ob-
jective question of true justice is not and  indeed  cannot  be the foremost
question  of political  morality  for liberal-minded  citizens.  The foremost
question for us has  to be that of the moral justifiability  of the  support
we give the prevailing regime by  our  daily  acts of collaboration  with it.
That question is certainly related in some way to the question  of the re-
gime's true liberal justice, its true compatibility  with everyone's  reasons,
but for liberals, the two questions cannot be identical.
They  cannot  because  of  what  I  shall  call  (in  the  style  of  John
Rawls) the fact of reasonable interpretive  pluralism-the  fact of inevita-
ble  irresolvable  uncertainty  and  irreparable  reasonable  disagreement
among inhabitants  of a more-or-less  free  country  about  the fundamen-
tal-legal interpretations  that justice requires.'  Here  I am not strictly  fol-
lowing  Rawls.  What  he  posits  is  a  "reasonable  pluralism"  of
comprehensive  ethical  views,'  whereas I am positing  a  reasonable  plu-
ralism of (morally crucial)  interpretations  of those  liberal  constitutional
principles on which the participants in Rawls's  ethical  pluralism  may  all
have reason to agree, taking the very  fact  of their ethical  pluralism  cen-
trally into  account.
For Rawls, a reasonable pluralism of comprehensive  ethical  views is
one  of those  "general  facts"  (or "circumstances  of justice")  that bear
crucially  upon  people's  reasons  for agreeing  or not to  a  set of  public
practical norms  affecting the very content of constitutional  justice. 66 But
it seems to me that reasonable  pluralism,  coupled  with the "burdens  of
judgment"  that  are said  to  underlie  this social condition, '  cuts deeper.
63.  See  JORGEN  HABERMAS,  BErWaEN  FACTS  AND  NoRMs  107,  447-48,  459,  566  n.15
(William Rehg trans.,  1996).
64.  See supra Part III.C, IV.B.
65.  A "comprehensive  view" is a conception  of "what is  of value in human  life,  and  ideals  of
personal character, as well as ideals  of friendship and of familial and  associational  relationships,  and
much else that is to inform our conduct, and in the limit to our life as  a  whole."  RAwLs,  supra note
36, at 13.
66.  See RAwLs,  supra note 36,  at 36-37,  66.  The  fact  of  reasonable  pluralism  is  said,  for
example,  to give people reasons that they might not otherwise  have  for  accepting  entrenched  norms
of toleration.
67.  Rawls  calls "burdens of judgment" the causes  of unliquidatable disagreement  about justice
among persons who,  being reasonable, all observe  and  report  honestly,  argue  cogently, and  share  a
"desire to honor fair terms of cooperation."  RAWLS, supra note 36,  at 54-55.  Among the causes  he
posits is the following:
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It cuts  to  the depth  of making  non-demonstrable  by  public  reasoning
any  authoritative  truth  about what justice requires  of constitutional  law
and its interpretation. 6 8 Reasonable  pluralism does not make truth in  this
matter  philosophically  unavailable,  or  beyond  reasoned  argument.
Rather, it makes  it politically unavailable  among  people  who, aware  of
human  frailty  and  respectful  of human  difference,  all perhaps  sharing
belief that there  is a truth  of the matter, can  neither  agree  on  what that
truth is nor dismiss  as unreasonable  all positions  opposed  to their  own.
Reasonable interpretive  pluralism thus opens a gap between the question
of true justice in politics  and the question  of what it is morally  right  or
justifiable for a citizen to do about the matter  of political force.  What is
worse, liberals, by  affirming  reasonable  (interpretive)  pluralism, present
themselves with the possibility that there is no  answer at all to the ques-
tion of what it is right  to do  about  this matter  of force.  In  other words,
they  present  themselves  with  the possibility  that  nothing  that  is  done
about it can be right  or morally  justifiable, that all  there  can be  is facts
of power. This is what John Rawls calls  "the  problem  of political  liber-
alism."69
For liberals, this problem must be solvable; but how can we solve it?
Only,  it appears,  by  specifying  some  attribute in a currently  prevailing
set of fundamental-legal  dispensations  that  could  morally  justify  any-
one's  acts in support  of the  always contested  regime  of force  that this
set constitutes. But what could this legitimating attribute be?
It must be one  that responds  in  some way to the issue of force.  It
must, in other words, be one that enables people subject to the regime to
abide by its laws, not just out of desire to avoid  painful  applications  of
force,  but  also  out  of  consciously-held  "respect  for"  the  lawmaking
regime itself.7 0 What attribute in a political regime  could  attract  such  re-
spect? Public knowledge that the regime  accords  with true justice would
surely  suffice,  but  it  is  exactly  this  possibility  that  the  fact  of
To some extent (how great we  cannot  tell) the way we  assess  evidence  and  weigh moral
and political values is shaped  by our total  [life]  experience,..  . and  our total experiences
must always differ.  Thus, in a  modem  society  with its numerous  offices  and  positions, its
various  divisions of labor,  its many  social  groups and  their ethnic  variety,  citizens'  total
experiences  are disparate enough for their judgments to diverge,  at least to some degree, on
many if not most cases of any significant complexity.
Id. at 56-57.
68.  Joseph Raz has somewhat similarly doubted  that "there  is reason  to think that one  is more
likely to be  wrong  about  the character  of the good life than  about the sort of moral  considerations
which all agree should influence political action such  as  the right to life,  to free  expression,  or free
religious worship.'  JOSEPH RAZ,  THE MORALITY  OF FREEDOM  160 (1986).
69.  RAWLS, supra  note 36, at vxiii.  Just so, the descent  of reasonable  pluralism  from  the level
of comprehensive ethical views to that of interpretation  of the principles  in a  political  conception  of
justice (or a corresponding  political constitution)  has  apparent  subversive implications  for  Rawls's
"political  liberal"  response to  the problem,  a  fact  about  "reasonable  interpretive  pluralism"  that
makes me nervous.
70.  See HABERMAS,  supra note 63, at 447-48.
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reasonable  interpretive pluralism precludes.  Consider, then, another  pos-
sibility. Perhaps  the continuous  and credible  exposure  of the  regime's
fundamental-legal  dispensations  to  the  critical  rigors  of  democratic
politics could allow everyone subject to the regime to abide  by  it out  of
respect for it.
To explain briefly: We find  ourselves  forced  to agree both  that ul-
timate  standards  of  fundamental-legal  rightness  cannot  be  left  to  de-
mocracy  to decide,  and  that some  official  organ  or  organs  have  to  be
authorized to decide  and  construe from  time to time the content  of the
fundamental  laws. Yet we cannot admit that any official's  judgment is a
reliable  guide  to  what is rightly required  of a  set  of  fundamental  laws
for  our country.  We might  nevertheless  believe  that  the  most  respect-
worthy judgments  will come  from  official  bodies  whose members  are
constantly  exposed  to  the  full blast  of  the  sundry  opinions  on  such
questions,  freely  and uninhibitedly  produced  by  assorted  members  of
society out of their diverse  experiences,  positions,  and  reflections.  Such
a belief could be rooted  in a tight mix  of epistemic  and  dignitary  con-
siderations.  In conditions  of doubt concerning  the reliability  of any  of-
ficial's  judgments  of  fundamental-legal  rightness,  and  given  some
reasonable  basis  for  hope  that  officials'  judgments  will  be  in  some
measure  enlightened  by  exposure  to  democratic  "critical  interaction"
(as Robert Post nicely calls the process),7  why should we not reserve our
respect  for  public  decision-making  arrangements  that  display  respect
for us, the citizens,  as potentially  competent  and  sincere contributors  to
political enlightenment?  Why should we not reserve our respect for offi-
cial efforts  that  are  always  working  toward  the  end  of  making  them-
selves  available  to be influenced by public deliberations  and debates that
are fully  and fairly receptive  to everyone's  opinions about justice?
Yet, a response  in  that form,  to  someone  demanding  justification
for support  of a given, current  regime  of  fundamental-legal  dispensa-
tions, can  never be complete.  The  response  speaks  of a process  that  is
"fully  and  fairly  receptive"  to everyone's  views, but  such  a process  is
always, inescapably,  a  legally  constituted  process.  It  is  constituted  not
only  by  laws  regarding  political  representation  and  elections,  but  by
laws regarding  civil associations,  families,  workplaces,  speech, property,
the media, and  so  on.  Thus  in order  to justify  my  support  of  a  set  of
fundamental-legal  dispensations  on the ground  that everyone  can  abide
by  them out of respect for  them,  I  would  have  to  establish  that  those
laws are what they democratically  ought to be.  The  laws regarding  elec-
tions, representation, families, workplaces, associations,  speech,  property,
and so on, would have to constitute a process  of more-or-less  "fair"  or
"undistorted"  democratic  political  communication,  not  only  in  the
71.  See PosT, supra  note 6, at 142-48.
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formal  arenas of legislation  and  adjudication  but also  in  civil society  at
large.  Democracy  would  have to be, in  that  sense,  "social."  But,  alas,
according  to the liberal premise of reasonable  interpretive  pluralism,  the
question  of whether the laws do or do not satisfy  this social-democracy-
constitutive standard  is always bound  to  be a matter  of contentious  but
reasonable  disagreement. We  seem  to have landed  right  back  in the fix
from which we seek escape.
Perhaps,  though, we have not landed back in exactly  the  same  spot.
I hope  that I have recast the problem  of political  legitimacy  in  such  a
way  that  conditions  are  imaginable--conditions  of  apparent  near-
democracy,  political  and  social-in  which  reasonable  citizens  can  call
upon  one  another  to  agree that the country  is pursuing  (in  good  faith
and decently  well) a political project in self-government  for  which there
can be no  final  end, but for which  there  is nevertheless  a  foundational
standard.  The  democratic  pursuit  of  democratic  justice  would  be  that
project. Its  first and constant  requirement  would be  this:  Decisions  that
have to be  reached  about the rightness  of basic political  arrangements,
that cannot  be consensually  reached,  are  nevertheless  reached  by  insti-
tutions that are always effectively  subjected to the pressures  of a public-
opinion-in-formation  that is bent  on  democratizing  itself and  the  legal
and social conditions  of its production.
VII
BRENNAN  ON  DEMOCRACY
If we turn now for one last time to Professor Post, that will lead  us,
finally, back to Justice Brennan.
We left Post, remember, saddled with  the "intuition"  that any  pro-
cedure-independent  standard  of  political  rightness  subverts  self-
government.  As I put the intuition:  If there  is some  substance  that  laws
must contain  in  order  to be  right, then  to that extent  it is not rightfully
up  to  any  of us to  say  what the laws  in  substance  shall  be.7 2  Thus,  we
cannot  be self-governing,  or at least not rightfully  so.  That  intuition,  I
said, was understandable.  But I now want to  say  that it may  nevertheless
be  mistaken.  One  might  think  it  possible  for  a  person  to  be  self-
governing  without that person's  having  any  moral  right, or  conceiving
herself to  have any  moral  right,  to  make the  laws  be  whatever she may
decide.
Consider, for example,  a person  willingly abiding  by  a set of fun-
damental  laws,  "out  of respect  for"  them, because  she finds  on  reflec-
tion that they are just, or fair, or in some other  sense as they ought to be.
It might  be said that this person  is in  a state  of  self-government,  in  as
72.  See supra Part III.B.
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full a sense as we can reasonably  hope to find  in politics. As always,  the
question is: What might it be about a set of fundamental  laws that would
enable  a person  to  abide by  them  out of respect for them?  One  could
take responsive-democracy  theory to  say that she  can respect  those  laws
(and  only  those  laws) the content of which she  may  influence  directly,
albeit fractionally,  by  her  contributions  to public  discourse.  This inter-
pretation,  however, will not work for anyone  believing in the  existence
of procedure-independent  standards  of rightness. If I believe there  are
such  standards,  then  the possible  attribute  in a set of fundamental  laws
that would command  my respect  for  them  cannot be my  retention  of a
shred  of control  or  influence  over what the laws say; it must  rather  be
that I have reason to believe that the laws are right, which is not at all the
same  thing, unless I believe myself to be exceptionally immune to moral
misjudgment.
Now complicate  the situation.  Suppose  you  believe  that there  are
procedure-independent  standards  of rightness  for  fundamental  laws  in
this country  now. And  suppose you  think  these standards  involve com-
mitments  both  to  political  self-determination  through  free  public  dis-
course  and to respect for individual human  dignity.  You do  not believe,
however,  that  anyone judging  in  isolation-not  yourself,  not  Justice
Brennan-is  a reliable  authority  as  to  exactly  what these  standards  of
rightness  require of an interpreted  set of fundamental  laws in this coun-
try.  In  fact, you  believe that the most reliable judge  must be  someone
who  is constantly  exposed  to the full  blast  of  the  sundry  opinions  on
such questions,  freely  and uninhibitedly produced  by  assorted  members
of society out of their diverse experiences,  positions,  and reflections.
If you hold this set of beliefs,  then  the attributes  in a set of funda-
mental  laws  that  would  command  your  respect  would  be  as  follows:
First, it would  have to appear  to you that a maximum  feasible  effort  is
constantly  being  made  to get the fundamental  laws  right.  This,  I  have
argued,  includes  getting  their  major  interpretations  right.  Quite  con-
ceivably,  this maximum feasible effort could  (as  Dworkin  contends)  in-
clude provision for a tribunal whose special business and concern it is  to
decide the interpretations.  Second,  this maximum  feasible  effort  to  get
the fundamental  laws right  would  have to include  arrangements  for ex-
posing  the  empowered  fundamental-law  deciders  to  the  full  blast  of
sundry  opinions  and  interest-articulations  in  society,  including  every-
one's opinions and articulations  of interests.  Note that what now matters
to you about having your  own opinions  and  interest-articulations  regis-
tered  is not some bit  of leverage  you  exercise  over what  gets  decided,
but rather the presumptive  epistemic  value  of your  contributions  to the
debate,  a value  which  you  will  not  self-respectingly  suppose  less  than
equal to that of others.
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Suppose  you  hold this  set of beliefs, including  the  belief that  the
preceding  two conditions  for  the production  of fundamental  laws  (and
their interpretations)  are currently  satisfied.  You, then,  can  abide by  the
fundamental  laws  (including  major  interpretations)  willingly, out  of re-
spect for them.  Are you not  then freely  governing  yourself,  at least so
far as politics are concerned?
Justice  Brennan  may  well  have  believed  something  along  these
lines.  Without a doubt  he believed  that  constitutionalism  both  presup-
poses procedure-independent  standards  of  fundamental-legal  rightness
and  requires  that  some  non-consensual  organ  or  organs  act  as  social
authorities  for the determination  of what those  standards  require  when
applied  to concrete  issues and  disputes.  Among  such  organs,  he  would
have included, in due  order  of rank,  Congress  and  state legislatures  (or
conventions)  enacting  constitutional  amendments,  conceivably  an  Arti-
cle V constitutional  convention,  constitutional  courts,  and  national  and
state  legislatures  enacting  ordinary  legislation.  But  Brennan  evidently
also believed  that self-government  exists only when people  abide  by  the
nonconsensual  resolutions  of such bodies  out  of respect  for them,  and
that nothing  can  warrant  the requisite  respect  short  of the  authorities'
exposure,  guaranteed  by  their  own  fundamental  legislative  and  inter-
pretative acts, to the full blast of sundry  opinions in society.
In this  way, Justice Brennan's  judicial  career  reflected  a commit-
ment to self-government  through  democracy.  It  seems that every  major
aspect of Brennan's  constitutional jurisprudence  coheres  with  this  set of
commitments  and beliefs.73 There  can be no doubt  that Brennan  saw his
Court  as invested  with authority  and  responsibility  to interpret  for  the
country  a procedure-independent  standard  of rightness, justice, and  de-
mocracy  for  its political  regime.  But it is enormously  to  his credit  that
he  saw  the  Court  as  thus  empowered  only  as  long  as  it  exercised  its
power with a view to protecting  and  expanding  the rights  and  opportu-
nities of everyone to impress their views upon the Court and other  social
authorities, democratically.
In his 1985  "Defense  of Dissents,"  Brennan  denied  that shows  of
disagreement  among  high  court  judges  disrupt  public  acceptance  of
73.  See  Michelman,  supra note  22,  at  1268-83.  Indeed,  one  striking  feature  of  the
jurisprudence might be called emblematic of it.  I mean  Brennan's insistence,  in his opinion  for  the
Court in NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963),  and his  dissenting opinion  in  Walker v.  Birmingham,
388 U.S. 307, 346-49 (1967)  (Brennan,  J.,  dissenting),  that the courts  themselves  are  legitimate  sites
of politics and not just of politics but of political agitation.  See Michelman, supra  note  22, at  1269-74.
I  mean  his remarkable  and  highly  controversial  proposal  that a  courtroom,  even  an  appellate
courtroom, is a site of passionate encounter between judge and litigant, or as  he  put it, between  "one
human being and another,"  and that judicial judgment  is, accordingly,  human judgment,  informed  by
the judge's reach  for a sympathetic  grasp  of the parties'  experiences  of the  case.  See  William  J.
Brennan,  Jr.,  Reason, Passion, and 'The  Progress of the Law,'  RFc.  Ass'N.  B.  CITY  N.Y. 948,  966
(1987).
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judicial  interpretive  authority.  To  the contrary,  he  said,  Americans  are
able  to know  themselves  as  a  free  people  precisely  because  and  only
insofar as their lawmakers, judges included,  "not  only  allow,  [they]  en-
courage  debate;"  they  "do  not  shut  down communication  as soon  as a
decision is reached."' 74  "As  law-abiders,"  Brennan  said, Americans  ac-
cept  as binding  the  conclusions  of  their decision-making  bodies,  but
only  in the confidence  that "our right to continue  to challenge  the wis-
dom of [any]  result [is] accepted by those who disagree  with us."75  This
is why, for Brennan,  the greatest  dissents  are  the  prophetic  ones,  "the
ones..,  that seek to sow seeds for future  harvest."76 As the Justice said
late in his judicial career, "it is only as each generation brings to bear its
experience  and  understanding,  its  passion  and  reason,"  that  there  is
"hope for progress  in the law."
If that be Brennanism, though, it still falls short  of everyone's  self-
government.  To  press your  views upon  ruling  authorities  is not  yet  to
rule. To find the laws deserving of your  respect  is not yet to decide  the
laws. Maybe  we need  a bit of Churchillian  irony  here.  Maybe,  indeed,
Brennanism  is the worst form  of democracy  except  all  the  others  that
have been tried from time to time. And all the others that have yet to be
tried?  Not  finding  that  a welcome  conclusion,  I  would  rather  end  by
saying that Justice Brennan  provided  us with a fair test. He gave us the
best  exhibition  of his version  of democracy  that  we  and  our  posterity
are ever likely to see.  I
74.  Brennan, supra  note 23, at 437.
75.  Id.
76.  Id. at 430-31.
77.  Brennan, supra  note 73, at 962; see also Michelman, supra note 22, at 1271-72.
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